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Certainly it would be foolish to posit, in a spe-
cies as wily and mendacious as our own, something like 
a primitive, irreducible will to truth—and Kant does 
not do so. And if the will to truth which regulates 
the procedures of pure speculative reason is to be 
founded in practical reason, this certainly does not 
mean that the will to truth is sustained by some pre-
sumed evidence of its utility for human nature, that 
is, for sensuous human nature lured by pleasures, af-
flicted with the phantasm, the phantom goal, of 
happiness. The unconditional will to truth, the will 
to not allow oneself to be deceived, is a special case 
of the will to not deceive; it cannot, Nietzsche has 
argued, owe its origin to a calculus of utility; the 
cunning of our reason, it's conceits and deceits, prove 
their utility every day. What imperative then makes 
the soul truthful? And how? 
1. The Command to be in Command 
The mind has the power, but not the inclination, to 
think. It thinks on command. The force of law is, for 
Kant, a fact. It is the first fact: facts can be 
conceived as facts in the measure that they can be ap-
prehended by a thought ordered by law—ordered not 
first by the universal and necessary laws of thought, 
but by the exigency for the universal and the neces-
sary, the imperative for laws. What is primary is not 
a subjection of the mind to the layout of real things, 
what Heidegger calls ontological truth or truthfulness, 
but rather, in Kant as in Heidegger too, conscience. 
Conscience in Heidegger 1B subjection to the imperative 
of death; it is, for Kant, subjection to law, that is, 
to the exigency for the universal and the necessary. 
Concepts of what is always and everywhere found in 
things, propositions formulating principles, are formed 
by a mind that is subject to law, and because it is 
subjected. Thought is obedience. 
The sense of law is not formed in a concept; law is 
not something that exists for the mind because the mind 
comprehends it, that is, produces it in a synthetic a 
priori judgment. The mind that conceives, that synthe-
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sizes data in representations, is already subject to 
law. One cannot ask if law is valid and true, and how 
that could be known. Before law is conceived, formu-
lated, understood, it is obeyed. It is because the 
mind'8 substance is receptive to the exigency for law 
that it can activate itself to think coherently and 
consistently. This receptivity, this passivity or this 
passion, this passive subjection which precedes and 
makes possible the first consistent formulation of an 
act of thought, is an intellectual feeling, the feeling 
in which the intellect is born; Kant calls it the sen-
timent of respect. Respect is, Kant says, something 
like fear, something like inclination. The mind fears 
law; law affects, afflicts, pains our sensuous nature 
and our natural appetites. The degree and exactitude 
of the correspondence of the mind with law is not 
something observed, as from without; it is felt. Felt 
in a feeling of assent, which is not exultant, not 
joyous, but is something like inclination—what Kant 
identifies as purely mental self-satisfaction. 
An animate being is one that is activated by it-
self, that is, by its own representations. Its senses 
form representations of what happens to affect them, 
represents them as containing pleasure or pain, which 
lure or repel the will. The mind obedient to law for-
mulates universal and necessary representations, repre-
sentations of principles, and these representations 
function normatively; they order the executive force of 
life. The mind thinks on command, but it is commanded 
to be in command. The law is, in Kant's formulation, 
that one should act in such a way that the maxim repre-
sented for your will is universal and necessary. 
The mind has to believe then that the representa-
tions of principle it presents can activate the will in 
life's organs and operations. The will energized by 
sensuous representations is activated from without. 
For although what lured the will in a sensuous repre-
sentation is the promise of pleasure it seems to con-
tain, and thus something inward, yet this pleasure is 
represented as consequent upon contact with something 
exterior. And the will released by sensuous represen-
tations is a will activated by particulars. By the 
here and the now, the contingent. To such an exter-
nally ignited, flickering will the sense of law opposes 
a will activated by principles its own representational 
faculty puts to it, and activated by the universal and 
necessary, a vital will thus activated always and in 
all circumstances, always in act—an ideal being of the 
will. Law commands first an inner transformation of 
the dependent, intermittent, servile human will, that 
wants, into a self-sustaining, self-maintaining ideal 
will, that orders. 
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2. The Types of Lawfulness 
But does such an ideal state of the will in fact 
exist? Mo one knows. One can give no example. There 
is no way of determining whether, in any given case, 
someone who appears to be acting against his own in-
terests and tastes, and in obedience to an inward re-
presentation of principle, is not in reality being ac-
tivated by unperceived external stimuli or unconscious 
internal drives. In any given case of ray own life, 
there is no way of determining whether, when I repre-
sented only the principle to my will, and acted in con-
formity with what the principle demanded, that was not 
a mere coincidence, and my psychophysical apparatus was 
not in reality being activated by imperceptible exter-
nal processes or unconscious internal impulses. There 
is, in general, no observation of causality, and, in 
particular, neither observation of, nor comprehension 
of, the noumenal causality by which a pure representa-
tion of principle could activate the will and the ner-
vous circuitry and musculature of my phenomenal body. 
Yet I am obligated by the law to imagine myself so con-
stituted that the practical employment of reason would 
be possible, that I could believe that my psychophysi-
cal apparatus could act solely in obedience to law. 
Imagination is required--a certain usage of the 
imagination is required in every case of an action 
framed in obedience to law. The law is an imperative 
laid on me; it commands me to frame my psychophysical 
existence into a succession of positions and actions in 
the empirical world that would be instances of what is 
universal and necessary. Syntheses have to be made of 
the pure idea of the law and the representations of the 
particularities of the each time contingent situation. 
For these syntheses, made in advance of the act, one 
needs what Kant calls "types n--procedures of the imagi-
nation to produce a general image. The types are gen-
eral matrices, like the schemata framed in the theoret-
ical use of reason, but they are practical; they are 
fabricated to serve as guides in practical judgment. 
The types have to be constructed by the imagination 
because, Kant has said, there really is no perception 
of any visible action done by anyone in the world that 
could reliably be taken to have been framed out of obe-
dience to law, and that could be generalized to serve 
as a model. In Kant's models the intuitive content is 
derived not from perceptible human acts, but from the 
behavior of physical objects, the structure of an in-
strumental complex, and the operation of the body 
politic. 
A first type derives from the image of the law-
regulated clockwork of physical nature. A nature—an 
object as determined by the natural sciences, or nature 
as a whole—is a system of elements regulated by 
universal and necessary laws, the laws of nature. One 
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is to imagine oneself making oneself natural—willfully 
putting an end to the exception, the anomaly, that 
one's psychophysical apparatus, operating arbitrarily, 
for its own pleasure, has been. Act in such a way that 
the maxim put to your will could be represented as a 
natural law, a universal and necessary law of nature. 
The mind is indeed obligated to constitute for it-
self an objective representation of nature, that is, 
not a re-presentation of the phenomenal forms that came 
to birth and die away, but a representation of the ex-
ternal universe as composed of objects which are 
natures, and which compose nature as a totality deter-
mined through universal and necessary laws. This 
theoretical, or pure, employment of reason is commanded 
by the moral imperative: the mind finds itself obli-
gated to construct an objective representation of the 
phenomenal field because it is obligated to represent 
the world for itself in such a way that it could make 
sense to be obedient to law in one's operations in that 
world. What makes the objective representation of 
nature binding is not its transcendent truth, its con-
formity with the facts of the things in themselves, but 
its conformity with the fact of the inner imperative. 
In reality to move from the pure sentiment of 
respect for the imperative to an understanding that the 
imperative is an imperative for law already requires a 
certain usage of pure reason. The properties of law— 
the formal properties of universality and necessity-¬ 
are learned from the formal logic that regulates the 
theoretical employment of reason in the construction of 
an objective representation of nature. Logic is used 
to pass from the primal intellectual feeling of being 
under an imperative to the understanding that the im-
perative is an imperative for the universal and the 
necessary in the practical employment of reason. The 
imagination commanded by this logic represents the 
universality and necessity which constitute the form of 
all nature as a force commanding us to naturalize 
ourselves. 
But is not the agitation produced by sensuous ap-
petites precisely action regulated by universal and 
necessary laws—those of psychophysiology? To be sure, 
but there the mind produces representations not of the 
law in the objects of those appetites, but of the 
pleasure. The imperative incumbent on the mind 
requires that one be mobilized exclusively by law. 
That means that one must no longer take the objects of 
the external world sensuously represented as termini, 
as ends in which the will comes to rest, but as means 
only, an instrumental system that in no way imposes it-
self or its order on the will. One must not take one's 
own rational faculty as a means to be put to the ser-
vice of, and be commanded by, one's own sensuously re-
presented composite nature. The way to not do that is 
to imagine the whole of external nature, and of one's 
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own sensuous nature, to exist as means only and not as 
ends also, as material, a pure medley of sensuous 
material, to be ordered by the decrees of the rational 
agent, and to imagine that rational agency in oneself 
already existing as a terminus. Kant formulates this 
type in the words: Act in such a way that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person 
of another, always at the same time as an end and never 
simply as a means. The action, he explains, has to be 
conceived only negatively. It is not: act so as to 
make your existence the end of all material nature; 
rather it is: never act against the unconditional 
worth, or dignity, of your own rational will, never 
subordinate its existence to any object—or to that 
sensuous object which is your composite material 
nature. 
The will that commands us to represent objects no 
longer according to the promise of pleasure with which 
our sensibility represents them, but only according to 
the universal and necessary laws with which our pure 
reason represents them, does not have our own welfare, 
our survival, in mind by thus excluding from view the 
seductive conceits of pleasure, the mirage of happi-
ness. But yet we can note that an organism that would 
naturalize itself so as to live in a world of necessity 
and not in a world of pleasures would no doubt survive, 
and survive more surely. This would be a sort of an-
thropological dividend, a species dividend, of individ-
ual rationality. 
When one acts one is then not to act to appropriate 
external goods, one is not to act as a predator; one's 
action is not to be commanded by the particular lacks 
and contingent wants of one's own nature. One is not 
to act to make oneself a producer, producing out of the 
material of nature new substances containing pleasures 
for one's own sensuous nature. Capitalist action, to 
produce new needs and new wants in our material and 
happiness-obsessed given nature, is interdicted by the 
moral imperative. Action in nature is also not to be 
conceived as gratuitous—whether as undertaken in order 
to proliferate dreams and dances in the utilitarian 
world of things that are means only and not ends also, 
or to make a dream or a dance out of one's own material 
nature. Action in nature is not to be conceived as 
care—as though the ends of nature, of that which grows 
of itself, could command our will. Rather rational man 
is obligated to imagine himself as master of nature, 
sovereign over nature, whose action in nature—and on 
his own nature—reduces entirely to executive acts, en-
joining the layout of external material to everywhere 
embody the rational decrees formulated within his own 
subject mind. 
But do in fact the real actions one will execute 
gear into and effect modifications in the layout of 
things in nature? How could one be assured of any con-
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cordance between the release of the noumenal causality 
of the rational will with the layout of the things in 
themselves whose appearances we represent to ourselves 
as regulated by the universal and necessary laws of 
objectivity? Could it not remain forever possible that 
when we believe we have activated our will by a repre-
sentation of principle contrived by thought alone, and 
believe that this will has activated the nervous circu-
itry and musculature of our bodies, and perceive ef-
fects in the external field that seem to be consequent 
upon that movement and to be in conformity with the 
principle we had formulated, this is not in fact but a 
coincidence, and that we are gratuitously believing in 
causality where there is only the succession of the 
toady retinue of our own subjective impressions? Yet 
we have to believe that it could make sense for us to 
command our will to realize rationally commanded ar-
rangements in external nature; we find ourselves obli-
gated to believe in a noumenal or ontological destina-
tion of the instrumentalities of nature to the decrees 
of rational volition. We are obligated to postulate 
the existence of God, creative designer of the kingdom 
of nature as well as of the ideal realm of the will, in 
order to be able to believe that such action could be 
possible, could be real. 
The things subject to the noumenal causality of our 
will have to be imagined as means only—but not means 
for us to become masters over nature, nor means to 
satisfy the wants and needs of our nature. They are 
means for the realization of the ordinances of our 
rational will. Our sovereignty then consists not in 
satisfying our nature, but in commanding all nature. 
It consists in constraining all nature to manifest the 
laws of our will, but a will upon which the universal-
ity and necessity of nature weighs, weighs alone and 
imperatively. 
It will be an analogy with the functioning of civil 
society that will enable us to imagine this imperative 
inner ordinance. Rational man must imagine his own in-
ner constitution after the constitution of a political 
entity that comes to exist and act on its own, not by 
repudiating the decrees of the mother country or 
foreign imperial power and disowning all law, but 
rather by setting up for itself a legislative faculty 
to dictate its own laws. Rational man must similarly 
imagine that the existence of his own will—or its 
freedom—consists in being bound by laws that are for-
mulated by his own faculty of thought, and not by the 
laws in effect in external material nature in which his 
substance is embedded, nor by those that regulate the 
forces of his psychophysical nature. It is of course 
not true that one perceives oneself as author of law; 
law is from the first incumbent on the mind, affects, 
afflicts the mind, is imposed on the affectivity or the 
sensibility of the mind, and is not conceived, that is, 
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posited in a synthetic a priori judgment. One is not 
the source of the authority of law in the universe of 
one's own representation; one rather willfully makes 
oneself into the locus where cosmic law is articulated 
and promulgated. But, Kant says, one must, like a 
citizen in a republic, act as if—one must imagines-one 
were obeying only laws one had decreed for oneself. 
And for others. One is commanded to command one-
self, but also to command others and to be commanded by 
them. The very sense of the other, not only another 
shape of sensuous material, a physico-chemical ap-
paratus, but a being one can interact with because he 
is an agent, is the sense of a will in him energized by 
representations of his own conception. The movements 
of an organism can also visibly be activated by stimuli 
affecting it from the outside, or by anonymous impulses 
arising within. The other exists on his own by acti-
vating himself with his own representations, represen-
tations not only presenting again or in advance exter-
nal contingencies, but formulating the exigency for law 
within. To perceive the other is to sense the law that 
the other imposes on himself. To recognize the other 
is to respect the other. Respect for others is not 
respect for their innate composite human nature, but 
respect for the law that rules in them. Respect is 
distinguished by Kant from admiration, admiration for 
the force of perfection of the tangible vital powers in 
another, which resembles the sentiment of the sublime 
in physical nature. 1 The sense of the other as a per-
son is the perception of the action of another as in-
stantiating a law which is valid for me also. 
Thus the others concern me, for the principles that 
govern their actions obligate me too. And, on the 
other hand, it enters into the very meaning of my own 
sovereignty that the law that I propose as a maxim for 
my own practical moves in the phenomenal sphere is a 
law I legislate for everyone. Acting morally consists 
in not taking oneself as an exception.* It is to not 
class oneself among deviants and monsters. It is to 
make one's moves such that they not only can be under-
stood with the principles common to all reason, but set 
forth principles binding on all. It is to make every 
move of one's life exemplary. Concretely this means 
that action, each gesture, each word, corresponds to a 
nature represented objectively, in universal and neces-
sary laws, and not to a nature sensuously represented 
according to the promise of any private pleasure it 
seems to contain. The existence that the law commands 
is a commanding existence; it consists in deciding the 
law with each of one's gestures and moves. Thoughtful 
existence does not simply obey norms; it acts always to 
make itself the norm. Each of one's actions becomes 
juridical; one acts so as to formulate the law for 
everyone. Sovereign existence is an existence not only 
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without particular, private interests, but without 
privacy, an existence through and through promulgating. 
3. Exemplar!ty and Veracity 
Moral existence is defined, negatively, as the 
elimination of the vices of lying, avarice, that is, 
subjection to material means, and servility.' Posi-
tively, it consists first and essentially in honorable-
ness, in veracity, in exemplary publicness.* The com-
mand of the categorical imperative is to conceive of 
the maxim of one's own will as a public law; the test 
of evil maxims is that they have to be kept from public 
view. Through secrecy one aims at a private life of 
one's own, which is the direct contrary of autonomous 
personality. Through dissimulation from others and 
from oneself one makes oneself "a mere deceptive ap-
pearance of a man."* Kant cites "even the wish of a 
lover to find nothing but good qualities in his beloved 
(which) makes him oblivious to her obvious faults;" 
such "insincerity in one's declarations, practised 
against oneself, deserves the strongest censure," as is 
formulated in Scripture, where the original evil and 
source of all evil is not the fratricide of Cain, but 
the first lie.' Truthfulness devolves not from the 
material value of truth for theoretical subjectivity, 
but from the essentially public, exemplary, existence 
the moral imperative imposes. 
It then belongs to the essence of the rational ex-
istence that it sovereignly enter into relationship 
with others. The kingdom—or republic—of ends is 
formed by internal bonds, it must not be conceived as 
simple coexistence of free and equal members, where the 
tangency of their spheres of sovereignty would be "due 
to the roundness of the earth" 7—as though if the sur-
face of the earth were an infinite plane men could be 
so dispersed that community would not be a necessary 
consequence of their existence on it." 
The society of sovereign legislators must not be 
imagined as an association through mutual aid, for the 
reasoned gratification of wants is no longer the moti-
vation of the will among them. Their very rationality 
is not constituted through mutual aid, as though the 
consciousness of each could only represent the particu-
lar and the contingent, and the representation of the 
universal and necessary truth could only be constructed 
by the assemblage of all these particularities and 
contingencies. Their society is not an association for 
mutual protection—although, it is true, civil society 
is first formed in order to guarantee to these lords 
over nature their sovereign possession of the earth and 
all its goods, against those who exist in a state of 
nature; they are indeed obligated to constrain all 
those in the state of nature to enter civil society, 
and presumably have at one point formed military asso-
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ciations for this purpose. Yet this motivation does 
not maintain or define the association of sovereign 
ones. And their society should not be imagined to ex-
ist for production. If these purely rational agents no 
longer recognize their own happiness as an incentive, 
they shall also not associate for a productivity that 
endlessly produces new desires and wants. The kingdom 
of ends is also not to be imagined after the model of 
an artist community, whether that which exists for the 
sake of producing artworks, Balinese, Newari or Nuba 
societies, or that which makes itself an artwork—the 
Samurai, the Jesuit order, the Prussian military caste 
(Nietzsche's examples). In this kingdom the members 
are existing ends, ends in themselves, and not means, 
not even for the creation of external splendor or in-
ternal sublimity. And their rational sociality does 
not consist in the ordered circulation of signs—goods, 
implements, women and messages—in systematically regu-
lated fields. Rational society forms a "nature" 
through the universal laws that necessitate the move-
ments of each of its members, but the universal laws 
are decreed by the sovereignly autonomous individuals. 
Each rational agent is a legislating sovereign, whose 
word binds all the others. The kingdom of ends is a 
society whose inner energeia is not the circulation of 
messages, but the promulgation of decrees. 
Positively, action in the republic of ends is imag-
ined as friendship. This friendship is not affection 
for others, and still less that sensitive enjoyment of 
their person which is affective love. Moral friendship 
is "the complete confidence of two persons in the mut-
ual openness of their private judgments and sensations 
as far as such openness can subsist with mutual respect 
for one another."' The kingdom of ends as a friendship 
of the autonomous sovereigns consists in the recipro-
cally exposed or manifest life, promulgating each of 
its deeds in veracity, in confident transparence to 
others. A friend I am indeed of Plato, but more a 
friend of the truth. In fact friendship is friendship 
of truth, friendship in the truth. Friendship is 
truthfulness. 
The law-promulgating representational mind in roe 
does not only command other minds in the kingdom of 
ends; it must also command the whole of my material 
human nature in the kingdom of nature. The imperative 
for law in me does not only command the pure specula-
tive employment of my reason, that it elaborate an ob-
jective representation of nature such that it can be 
imposed on all minds wherever and whenever they are 
found; it also commands the practical employment of my 
reason, it commands me to act in this nature. It com-
mands me to treat all nature practically as in itself a 
field of means for the rational ordinances of my sov-
ereign will. I am obligated to postulate the existence 
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of God, creative designer of the instrumentalities of 
nature as well as of the kingdom of existent ends, in 
order to be able to believe that what I represent in my 
objective representation of nature can undergo the nou-
menal causality of my will. The kingdom of ends needs 
this truth. The friendship of the truthful ones, each 
commanded to formulate always what is binding on all, 
requires the transcendent validity of their objective 
representation of the phenomenal order. 
4. Nietzsche: The Anthropological Imperative and the 
Imperative of Nature 
Nietzsche has put a question mark on the value of 
this truth. It is not simply on the worth of the 
postulate of God that sustains it—for if indeed God 
himself should prove to be our most enduring lie, 1 0 his 
existence is bound up with our grammar. 1 1 It is the 
correspondence itself, the truth thus being guaranteed, 
that Nietzsche questions. Kant, who recognized that 
not only the secondary properties of the things, but 
the primary properties also, are phenomenal, exist for 
us but cannot be said to exist in themselves, continued 
to suppose that the order upon which the noumenal 
causality of the will acts consists of things, enti-
ties, beings. It is this supposition, for which the 
creative God is the practical guarantee, that Nietzsche 
judged to have not truth, but only value—anthropo-
logical value. The practical suppositions that there 
are beings, identities, enduring entities, beings that 
are the same, Nietzsche recognized to be ontological 
postulates, transcendental errors, motivated by the 
logical axioms of identity, non-contradiction, excluded 
middle, which regulate our objective or intersubjective 
representation of the phenomena. These fundamental 
logical axioms and ontological postulates have in fact 
enabled the species to survive; it can be supposed that 
countless species with more cautious sensibilities, 
which did not have the power to judge that any force 
maintains itself identical from one moment to the next, 
that what is similar is in fact the same, that a force 
can be counted on to act as similar ones that seemed to 
be of the same kind have acted—such more refined, more 
truthful organisms have perished. The human organism 
has long since incorporated the fundamental logico-
ontological errors; its sense organs have become selec-
tive, simplifying, falsifying organs. They have come 
to perceive the phenomenal flux as so many appearances 
projected from an order of forms of beings, as appear-
ances of beings, self-identical entities, persisting 
and recurring identities. 
This representation is of value, anthropological 
value, not value to the individual for the constitution 
of his individuality, but to the species as such, herd 
value. The speech acts put forth by the individual but 
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which function to bind all the others, that action by 
which the animals endowed with representational thought 
constitute themselves into an association of ends for 
which all nature is means only, are made possible by 
these logico-ontological errors. 
But Nietzsche goes on to show that the signs of the 
individual that have the force to bind all the others 
are from the first the signs of the others, of the spe-
cies, in the individual. The individual whose moves 
all lay claims on the others, demand to be recognized 
by the others, is not the instinctual individual, but 
the rational individual, and already the conscious 
individual. Consciousness is the sphere of this imper-
ative of the genius of the species in the individual. 
Self-consciousness is articulated semiotically. N[T]he 
subtlety and strength of consciousness I is] always 
proportionate to a man's . . . capacity for communica-
tion . . . . 1 1 1 1 Consciousness was developed not un-
der an immanentist, self-appropriative compulsion, but 
out of a communicative need; what of oneself is mir-
rored in the sphere of consciousness is that for which 
one possesses signs. That of ourselves which we have 
acquired the power to articulate in signs, to verbalize 
in the inner dialogue of consciousness, is that which 
we have needed to communicate--our wants, our needs, 
our impotences. What out of its sovereignty the 
Kantian autonomous consciousness proclaims to others is 
not a surplus force produced by its instinctual nature, 
but the rational force that dominates the cravings of 
nature, that is, maintains them in their want, reduces 
them to impotence. 
Consciousness was developed not out of a compulsion 
to discharge the original excess life produces, life 
is, but out of the need to communicate wants and 
requirements; it expresses the shallowest and worst 
part of ourselves, the surface of vulnerability. The 
inner dialogue is not conducted in the indicative mode, 
but in judicatory forms; it formulates the inner 
processes of life as demands put to another. 
Consciousness functions not only to position us in the 
field of gregarity as individual negativity putting 
demands on the others, universalizing its necessities, 
but functions as a means to become shallower and 
weaker. The negativity in terms of which consciousness 
formulates itself to force the recognition of the other 
appeals to the will to power in the other, the will to 
enslave in the other. This is not to be equated with 
respect for the other; to respect the other is to 
respect the law that rules in the other: his law, his 
own destiny. The will to position oneself in the eyes 
of the others as demand is already a will to be en-
slaved, the will to make oneself servile. 
Consciousness articualtes the imperative laid on 
oneself into demands put on' the other. But the impera-
tive precedes consciousness and does not have as its 
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function to make consciousness possible. The impera-
tive is not an imperative of the species, of human 
nature, but of nature. The imperative force of nature 
is felt in the measure that the monstrous insipidity of 
man as the measure of the value of things, as judge of 
the world, man as a "world-negating" principle is ex-
posed. "We"—Nietzsche says--"laugh as soon as we en-
counter the juxtaposition of 'man and world', separated 
by the sublime presumption of the little word 'and'." 1 , 
The imperative force of nature on the soul is discov-
ered in the measure that the soul is naturalized, that 
is, in the measure that it abandons the demand for sat-
isfaction or contentment, "wretched contentment," not 
its vital compulsions, but its consciousness formu-
lates. "The total character of the world . . . is in 
all eternity chaos—in the sense not of a lack of ne-
cessity but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, 
beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for 
our aesthetic anthropomorphisms . . . . (H|ow could we 
reproach or praise the universe? Let us beware of at-
tributing to it heartlessness or unreason or their op-
posites; it is neither perfect nor beautiful, nor 
noble, nor does it wish to become any of these things 
. . ."'* To uncover pure nature through a negative la-
bor of de-idealization, de-aestheticization, de-morali-
zation, de-deification Nietzsche fixes as the scienti-
fic task of the age. 
Positively the essence of all nature is disclosed 
in the formula of the eternal return of all things, the 
law which formulates the pure flux of becoming, the ir-
remediable temporality of all things. The law of eter-
nal return diagrams what ontological thought had seen 
as the infinite distance from nothingness to something 
that comes to be, the irremissibility of becoming and 
its irrevocable weight, as a time of the unending re-
currence of whatever comes to pass. It formulates the 
most ancient thought there is, taught already in the 
most ancient documents of the East and the West, and 
the most scientific idea, formulating the essence of 
modern science. The old sciences of the West, formed 
by the logico-ontological errors, were sciences of 
forms; modern science is a science of forces; forces 
explain the forms by their passage and recurrence. 
Every force in nature, and the total quantum of forces, 
however immense, is finite; the idea of an infinite 
force or of an infinite field of forces, force that 
would bear against nothing, is self-contradictory. But 
the time in which science situates nature is infinite. 
If then nature ever had a goal, it would long since 
have been reached (since nature has already had an in-
finite time to reach it); if nature ever aimed at any 
final state of equilibrium, it would already have been 
attained, and all movement stopped. The fact that 
nature is now observably in a state of becoming proves 
that no such goal is possible. In the infinite exten-
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sion of time all that is possible will be realized, but 
the tide of becoming cannot be arrested; nature having 
worked out all its possibilities can only repeat them 
once again, and innumerable times. 
The law is not just a cosmological generalization; 
it functions imperatively, orders the soul. It is not 
just a formula, formed by the synthesizing powers of 
the mind and that can be comprehended by the mind; it 
is a force, and crushes, or transforms the soul that is 
forced to contain it. Every life which is in any way 
negating with regard to itself, resentful and ran-
corous, regretful and remorseful, or apprehensive, anx-
ious or hopeful with regard to any of its own states, 
will feel itself subjected to the irremediableness of 
all that comes to pass, and sealed in the most desper-
ate kind of despair, that from which the hope for noth-
ingness is taken, that for which suicide is the most 
illusory kind of cure. The law is incumbent on me; it 
is a singular, singularizing law, that makes human ex-
istence as such, species existence, impossible. 
Species existence made possible by the fundamental 
logico-ontological errors is now seen to have been 
promulgated in order to give lie to, in order to be the 
lie that covers over, the truth of the eternal return 
of all things. The Nietzschean genealogy of morals 
shows that the aesthetic, religious, theological and 
scientific representations of the universe in which 
species existence is installed are contrived by an es-
sentially and increasingly ascetic intellect; the 
Nietzschean psychology shows that the will's ill will 
against itself and against time idealized in the aes-
thetic, philosophic, sacred, sacerdotal and scientific 
epochs of species history is made imperative in order 
to give lie to the law of the irremissible becoming, 
coming from nowhere, going nowhere, of the forces in 
all forms. 
But upon the life that is powerful enough to be 
able to endure it, the law of eternal return functions 
to bind imperatively that life to itself, to make it 
necessary for itself. Every impulse of life turned on 
the fragments, riddles, dreadful accidents of which its 
course is composed will become possible only on condi-
tion that it is unrestrictedly willed, willed with a 
will without reservations, without claims, demands or 
appeals, a will that wills itself without limit. I 
shall henceforth be able to execute an action only on 
condition that I can will it without reservation, to 
the point of willing its infinite reiteration; I shall 
henceforth be able to feel any feeling only on condi-
tion that I can discharge all my forces into it without 
recompense; I shall henceforth be able to suffer any 
suffering only on condition that I can die in and of 
this suffering without regret or pity. The law impera-
tively makes the soul make itself necessary for itself; 
it makes it make the singular contingencies—the frag-
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ments, riddles, dreadful accidents—of which it is made 
imperative for itself. 
The soul under the imperative of the law is not 
motivated by the lure of pleasure, that is, content-
ment, "wretched contentment," wants nothing and demands 
nothing of the earth or its gods, is not driven by a 
will for power. Its will is power, and has the power 
to will itself unremittingly. It does not will any-
thing other than itself, dees not strive to constitute 
itself into an exemplar or statute for the genus, does 
not strive, long for or demand. It sovereignly wills 
the discontinuous impulses that build and intensify and 
need only to pass, to discharge themselves, these grat-
uitious and fortuitous impuses of its existence, as 
necessary for itself, and makes them necessary by the 
unrestricted adhesion of will in them. 
5. The Power to be Veridical 
The law functions to make sovereign the soul that 
has the force, the power to endure it; it also func-
tions to make it truthful. Sovereignty is truthful; 
the very word noble signifies those who are capable of 
living by the truth. Their internal constitution is 
such that they can affirm all that is and becomes--not 
only the forms formed according to the fundamental 
logico-ontological axioms, our multiplication tables 
and our grammar read into things, but all that is and 
becomes and becomes nothing, honey and lees, drunken 
midnight, tombs and tomb-tears' comfort, gilded evening 
glow, woe, hell, hatred, disgrace, the cripple, world— 
"this world, 0 you know it!" 1* The soul vast as the 
world, the soul able to open to the world, would have 
to be able to affirm itself incessantly, affirm unre-
mittingly its own impulsive passage, all its own im-
pulses which affront, which discharge into, all the 
fragments, riddles, dreadful accidents of the world. 
It would have to negate no will that passed in itself 
nor resist any will to come. Such a soul is no longer 
a portentous power of negativity, but wholly self-af-
firmation. 
This soul has to learn the new Zarathustran way to 
"carry together into One what is fragment and riddle 
and dreadful accident." 1' The way of metaphysics, the 
way of comprehension, is to make the elements, un-
knowns, contingencies of the universe into one by com- ^ 
posing into a totality, a system, their meanings. The 
way to affirm what is is to affirm its meaning. 
Metaphysical comprehension is the enterprise of ex-
hibiting the universal meaning of the particulars, the 
system composed by all the fragments, the finality and 
necessity of all the happenings, the affirmation com-
posed by all the negations, rendings and death. "Death 
. . . is of all things the most dreadful, and to hold 
fast to what is dead requires the greatest strength," 
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Hegel wrote. "But the life of Spirit is not the life 
that shrinks from death, and keeps it untouched by 
devastation, but rather the life that endures it and 
maintains itself in it . . . (Sjpirit is this power 
only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying 
with it. This tarrying with the negative is the magi-
cal power that converts it into being." 1 7 Nietzsche 
for his part does not believe in this magical power of 
the dialectical mind, to convert the pain, transience 
and death of all things into the ideal subsistence of 
meaning. His genealogy shows this magical conversion 
into meaning and ideality, the dialectical cleverness 
which could, like divine reason, abominable spider, 
weave all things together with rational connections, 
reckoning a goal and purpose for each thing within the 
whole, to have been in truth the systematic devaluation 
of transience and of all transitory things. This reck-
oned relating is a relativizing, an affirming of each 
thing as means only and not as end also. Nietzsche 
does not come to teach a more clever way still to con-
trive meaning for all things, and thus affirm them. 
His affirmation will consist not in subordinating them, 
through meaning, through significance, to one another 
and to the whole, but in affirming the worth of what 
has no significance, in affirming as an end unto itself 
what does not serve another. What Nietzsche has found 
is an affirmation of all things through affirming their 
value. 1* Value and meaning are no longer identical. 
To apprehend the value of something is not to grasp its 
referentiality. Value is no longer instrumental or 
teleological; to affirm value absolutely is not to af-
firm that something is an end relatively, in view of 
something, or in view of the rational designs of sov-
ereign man; it is to affirm that it is an end in itself 
and not for us. 
The law functions imperatively to bind the soul to 
itself unreservedly, to make it unremittingly affirma-
tive in its own inner constitution, and thus able to 
affirm the value of, to love all the impulses upon 
which the fragments, riddles and dreadful accidents of 
the world press; it gives the soul the power to be 
truthful. But is the law itself truthful? 
6. The Truth of the Law that Imposes Veracity 
Eternal recurrence is, Nietzsche says, the most 
scientific idea, the final idea produced by the struc-
ture of all modern science, the idea that formulates 
the ontological diagram of all that science knows. But 
Georg Simmel already in 1907 produced a model for the 
universe composed of a finite number of entities but 
destined to endure an infinity of time, which would be 
in continual motion and yet never return to any given 
position; it would be enough to set in motion on an 
axle three wheels turning at speeds of n, 2n and J3— . 1 9 
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To this one could object that such a universe would be 
constructed out of entities, whereas the Nietzschean--
the modern scientific—universe is rather constructed 
out of processes. Arthur Danto has then argued that 
every process which proceeds continually from state 0 
to state n passes through a flux of transition infin-
itely divisible; a universe made of two such processes 
could proceed through an infinity of time without ever 
reproducing any given configuration they form. 1* 
To this one might first try to object, with 
Heidegger, that the Nietzschean law of eternal return 
is an ontological and not empirical law, and can be 
neither confirmed or invalidated by the empirically 
observable. The law of the eternal return of all 
things concerns the way of being of all that is, not 
only the objects of nature, but also the essence of the 
subject himself, the inner diagram of the most truthful 
soul. But as a law formulating what it means for the 
objects of cognition—of scientific congnition—to be, 
to be in becoming, it is a cosmological law, or what 
Husserl characterizes as a law belonging to the formal 
and a priori ontology of nature. Its formulation as a 
cosmological law is the means of access to an ontologi-
cal thesis; that is why Nietzsche could determine to go 
to Paris to study physics for ten years in order to 
make himself the teacher of the law of the eternal 
return of all things. The Simmel and Danto arguments 
are not empirical determinations; they are epistemolo-
gical considerations whose effect is to show that the 
law of eternal return is not a cosmological law built 
into the structure of our science. This law does not 
belong to the totality of all that which we know, which 
we determine to be true. 
Nietzsche did not publish any reference to the law 
of eternal return which tried to argue it as a 
cosmological law; only in notes which he chose not to 
publish did he discuss the possibility of establishing 
it scientifically. What he published were texts that 
consider the force, the effect of this thought upon the 
soul that thinks it. "What if some day or night a 
demon were to steal after you into your loneliest lone-
liness and say to you . . . . If this thought gained 
possession of you, it would change you as you are or 
perhaps crush you . . . " But what if the law of eter-
nal return were false? Were to not belong to the sys-
tem of all that which we know, our science? What if 
the law of eternal return were the lie that makes the 
soul truthful? 
The law of the eternal return of all things is not 
a metaphysical law; it does not formulate the essence 
of the things in themselves beneath their phenomenal 
surfaces; it rather is an ontological law, law formu-
lating the essence of being--way of becoming--of the 
appearances themselves. It is the internal law of pure 
nature—as opposed to the human-all-too-human represen-
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tation of nature which the Nietzschean genealogy has 
shown to have been elaborated pragmatically, for its 
utility and not for its truth. It is the law of the 
pure surface, the phenomenal mantle that phosphoresces 
about the most comprehensive soul, the truthful soul, 
as opposed to the representation of nature constructed 
according to the fundamental logico-ontological errors 
by the esentially mendacious intersubjectivity, the 
genius of the species. Nietzsche certainly took it to 
be the law that rules in the modern scientific repre-
sentation of the universe as an electromagnetic field 
of forces divested of all teleology. The Simmel and 
Danto arguments have not established that it cannot be, 
only that it need not be. 
Yet science is not the only access to pure nature, 
true nature; there is enlightenment in religion. Not 
in the modern religion, to be sure, the moral religion, 
Platonism for the usage of the people, with its impre-
catory perception which perceives the world as ac-
cursed, its penal interpretation of the construction of 
the universe, its juridic and executive God who is 
dead, who is death, formula for immateriality, immobil-
ity, intemporality, formula for the pure contradiction 
of life and sentence formulated on all that lives. 
This religion is not enlightenment, but cult of con-
science, guilt culture. Nietzsche's first work is 
devoted to the psychoanalysis, of the enlightenment 
found in the old religions, in particular the tragic 
culture which theoretical, dialectical, Socratic, op-
timist culture supplanted, which it was contrived in 
order to destroy. Nietzsche concentrated the powers of 
his analytic tools on the actor of the tragic age, not 
the actor of laborious, progressive, technological 
culture, who transforms the forms of the world, but the 
non-serious agent, actor who only transforms his own 
forms. The analysis is not concerned with the cogni-
tive content of the subjectivity of the actor, the 
question of the truth-value of his representations; in 
fact the whole of the phenomenal universe this con-
sciousness objectifies and regulates about itself is 
only phenomenal, phantasm, false. What is taken se-
riously is not the ideas and forms that occur to the 
actor's consciousness, but his feeling, his pleasure. 
What is the specific pleasure of the actor, pleasure of 
this most superficial man, who is anybody or nobody, 
who represents everybody, who uses all his forces only 
to transform his own form, or, more exactly, to give 
form to his life, to contract the figure and the co-
herence and the necessity of an identity, a perfection, 
a destiny, making every intonation of his voice, every 
position of his glance, his fingers, his torso, every 
contingency of his complexion, his profile, his size 
and shape and color significant, telling, essential? 
His pleasure is creator's pleasure, pleasure of creat-
ing a form of life, but it is a pleasure that is not 
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diminished when that form of life has been brought to 
its completion, its perfection, its end, for the actor 
feels in himself the force to reproduce that form, or 
another, the following night. This pleasure functions 
as metaphysical consolation—consolation for our grief, 
for the mortality of every form of life, and of our own 
form. It is the ecstatic pleasure known by the 
Dionysian initiate who comes in the night not to 
renounce his civic identity in the indeterminism of 
nocturnal dissolution, but rather to exchange robes and 
roles and destiny in a promiscuity of generalized 
transvestitism, subject into king and king into sub-
ject, man into woman and woman into man, human into 
satyr and satyr into human, slave into god and god into 
slave. And this pleasure, this expulsion from every 
stasis, is deep. In communicates with, indeed issues 
out of, the joy of nature—and nature is powerful and 
joyous, and all joy is natural, and the upsurge of the 
natural in us. The natural joy consists not in the 
maintenance of certain forms, but in the continual 
creation and destruction of forms of life—I believe 
the old Teutonic saying, Nietzsche wrote in his youth, 
all the gods must die. 
Thus, in the midst of a mind being employed to pro-
duce a representation of nature which is phenomenal, 
phantasmal, false, without transcendent truth and even 
without anthropological, species, value, there is pro-
duced a pleasure which is deep, which is ontological, 
an illumination which has ontological veracity. 
The progressive, optimist, theoretical culture that 
was contrived to supplant and to repress the tragic, 
prehistorical ritual culture abolished this enlighten-
ment. But we live in a time of reminiscence; Nietzsche 
himself is a reminiscence of rituals long discredited 
and of an enlightenment long forgotten. The historical 
sense is the distinctive virtue and disease of our age. 
To many the historicism, the relativism, engendered by 
the historical sense is the instrument of a great im-
poverishment and coldness, the extinction of the old 
fires that illuminated the dawns of the great vision-
aries; to others it is the sign of stealthily approach-
ing invalidism and the senility of a philistine 
theoretical civilization. But to Nietzsche the will to 
assemble all the history of humanity to make it our own 
history is the distinctive means produced by our 
culture for the production of power, for the passage to 
absolute spirit. But for that the historical sense 
must not be formed dialectically, retaining of the past 
and the bygone its meaning, depending on the dialecti-
cal fecundity of meaning to engender a future for it-
self, and on the dialectical assemblage of all meanings 
to put us in possession of all that can be. Nietzsche 
does not believe in memory and in the dialectical 
fecundity of meaning; he believes rather in the fecun-
dity of forces, instinctual and unconscious forces, 
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compulsion to dream and compulsion to dance, forces 
that regain their strength once precisely they have 
been forgotton, liberated from their meaning, from the 
chains of meaning. 
We of the present day are only just beginning to 
form the chain of a very powerful future feeling, 
link for link—we hardly know what we are doing 
. . . . Anyone who manages to experience the his-
tory of humanity as a whole as his own history 
will feel in an enormously generalized way all 
the grief of an invalid who thinks of health, of 
an old man who thinks of the dreams of his youth, 
of a lover deprived of his beloved, of the martyr 
whose ideal is perishing, of the hero on the 
evening after a battle that has decided nothing 
but brought him wounds and the loss of his 
friend. But if one endured, if one could endure 
this immense sum of grief of all kinds while yet 
being the hero who, as the second day of battle 
breaks, welcomes the dawn and his fortune, being 
a person whose horizon encompasses thousands of 
years past and future, being the heir of all the 
nobility of all past spirit—an heir with a sense 
of obligation, the most aristocratic of old no-
bles and at the same time the first of a new 
nobility--the like of which no age has yet seen 
or dreamed of; if one could burden one's soul 
with all of this—the oldest, the newest, losses, 
hopes, conquests, and the victories of humanity; 
if one could finally contain all this in one soul 
and crowd it into a single feeling—this would 
surely have to result in a happiness that huma-
nity has not known so far; the happiness of a god 
full of power and love, full of tears and 
laughter, a happiness that, like the sun in the 
evening, continually bestows its inexhaustible 
riches, pouring them into the sea, feeling 
richest, as the sun does, only when the poorest 
fisherman rows with golden oars! This godlike 
feeling would then be called--humanity. 1 1 
The historical sense is not a consciousness consti-
tuted by the dialectical assemblage of all the meanings 
of all the past deeds of mind; it is rather the feeling 
produced by the accumulation, the compression into one 
soul, of all the griefs, melancholies, despairs, bold-
nesses, welcomes, exultations, inebriations of all past 
spirit; not the synthetic integration of all these 
forces—their compression, their juxtaposition, the 
maintenance of them in the cauldron of one's own soul. 
Nietzsche does not envisage a progressive constitution 
of a historical consciousness through active recall and 
memory; what is at stake is rather the return of feel-
ings, the return of the savage and nomadic compulsions 
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that have long been extinct and the instincts of the 
blond beasts that dreamt the old dreams that have long 
been forgotten. The most comprehensive soul Nietzsche 
envisages is the place of this return. 
The historical sense is our participationist rit-
ual, our transvestitism and our form of orgy. It is 
now not called metaphysical consolation, but beatitude, 
the highest form of spirit, divine subjectivity, the 
happiness of a god full of power and love, full of 
tears and laughter, not the happiness of fulfillment, 
contentment, wretched contentment, and not that of 
tranquillity, equilibrium, quiescence and bliss, but 
ecstatic exultation, ecstatic squandering. It would be 
at the same time natural, like the sun, hub of nature, 
subject to an imperative of expenditure without recom-
pense. The identity of spirit and nature would then be 
called humanity; it is total humanity in the individ-
ual, which knows the world, has been broken on all its 
fragments, understood all its figures as riddles, 
needed all its contingencies. This most comprehensive 
soul is truthful, not because it fabricates for itself 
a representation of original nature and then observes 
the correspondence of its representation with that 
original; rather it itself corresponds with the forces 
of nature, it is constituted as the space of a return 
of all the visionary and intoxicated intensities of 
history which responded and corresponded to the sweep 
and countersweep and ebb and flood of nature. There is 
correspondence, concordance between the divine happi-
ness of that soul and the joyous force of all nature. 
Which correspondence is fixed in the emblem of eternal 
return, both the most ancient and the most modern form 
of philosophical doctrine, both the most universal 
cosmological law and the most singular, singularizing, 
law. 
One will demand now to know: How is this cor-
respondence produced? Whether this correspondence is 
an exact one? How is the exactitude of the correspon-
dence known? 
The correspondence is produced by nature in our 
nature. The soul does not make itself truthful through 
an asceticism and a discipline performed on itself, 
through an active synthesis of all the possible af-
firmative forces which bear the faces and figures of 
every noble, that is, truthful, life of history. The 
soul does not make itself truthful through a productive 
imagination which positions it in an ideal kingdom of 
ends, commanding all, commanded by each. The most com-
prehensive soul is rather the locus of a return of ata-
vist compulsions and long forgotten instincts. As in 
the tragic rituals of enlightenment, it is when the 
ego, sovereign legislator, or representative of the 
republic, is steeped in unconsciousness, drugged or in-
toxicated, that there is a resurgence of forces of 
nature in his nature. It is to his withdrawal outside 
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of all culture, to the loneliest heights of nature, his 
long proximity with the sun hub of nature, that Zara-
thustra owes all his wisdom. 
That which proves the correspondence is an exact 
one is the indefatigably powerful, unreservedly af-
firmative state of the soul in which it is produced. 
It is not the inner labor of negativity which deter-
mines, which terminates, which makes into terms, enti-
ties, identities, beings, that is capable of knowing 
the world, but the soul become capable of affirming all 
its own impulses that arise fortuitously and discharge 
and demand nothing from the fragments, riddles and 
dreadful accidents that press upon them, from hell, ha-
tred, disgrace, the cripple, world--this world, oh, you 
know it! The radical absence of every negativity, ev-
ery reactivity, resentment, regret from the soul en-
sures the exactitude of its correspondence with the 
world. 
The exact degree of truthfulness of the soul is not 
known out of a comparative estimation of that which 
would be formulated in an image of its inner constitu-
tion and of that formulated in the formula in which the 
essence of the world is conceived--representations 
which would themselves be produced by that soul. Where 
the will to truth is founded on the compulsion to de-
cree the meaning of each of one's acts as a law binding 
everyone, the one who appraises the aptness of any 
maxim of his own will to be a universal law for every 
rational nature can only be one decreeing what his ap-
praisal formulates. The veracity of the soul cor-
responding with its law ' can be known to itself only 
through an inner adhesion of that soul to itself as its 
law opens it upon the world. This adhesion can have 
negative or positive quality—can be resentment, nega-
tivity, pain inflicted on itself, or assent to itself. 
"This ultimate, most joyous, most wantonly extravagant 
Yes to life represents not only the highest insight but 
also the deepest." 1 2 
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